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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 860220-CA

-vROBERT HOLYOAK,
Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled
substance, cocaine, a third-degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Repl. Vol. 1986).

Prior to trial,

defendant moved to suppress the evidence based upon invalidity of
the search warrant due to lack of probable cause and a hearing
was held on March 1, 1986.
suppress.

Judge Harding denied the motion to

Defendant was tried before a jury and convicted in the

Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, the
Honorable Ray M. Harding presiding on April 9, 1986.

Judge

Harding sentenced defendant to serve not less than five years at
the Utah State Prison but suspended imposition of the sentence
and placed defendant on 18 months probation with a jail term of
90 days and ordered defendant to pay a $500 fine.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 14, 1986 Sgt. Bradley Leatham, a Provo City
police officer, received a tip from a confidential informant that
defendant possessed cocaine at his home (R. 207, 211, 336).
Based upon this tip, Sgt. Leatham presented an affidavit for a

search warrant to Eighth Circuit Judge McGuire and later executed
the search warrant at defendants home and seized approximately
two grams of cocaine and a white powder appearing to be vitamin B
powder commonly used for cutting cocaine (R. 211, 218, 262, 264,
345).

Also seized were several firearms and a handgun that was

found under defendant's pillow (R. 243). Defendant filed a
motion to suppress the cocaine prior to trial which Judge Harding
denied (R. 16, 51-53, 334-371).

After a jury trial, in which

defendant did not object to admission of the cocaine, defendant
was convicted of possession of cocaine (R. 78, 281). Defendant
now appeals claiming that Judge Harding erred in failing to
suppress the cocaine and in failing to order disclosure of the
confidential informant's name.
At the suppression hearing, Sgt. Leatham testified that
he composed the affidavit in support of the request for a search
warrant and attempted to avoid including so much information that
defendant could discern the identity of the confidential
informant (C.I.) (R. 338). The C.I. had previously given Leatham
information leading to arrests in two other cases, however, these
specific arrests were not mentioned in the affidavit as the basis
for his reliability (R. 336-337) (See Appendix A for copy of
Affidavit).

Leatham talked to the C.I. three times to confirm

the information provided and to get a complete description of
defendant's home (R. 209, 340). The C.I. did not receive money
in exchange for the tip but did receive a plea bargain on pending
drug charges in exchange for his work on other drug cases (R.
341).

The C.I. told Leatham that about one ounce of cocaine was
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located in defendant's bedroom under the plywood in a waterbed
frame (R. 208, 213, 216-17, 344).
A second C.I. told a fellow officer that defendant
distributed large quantities of cocaine which defendant often
transported in his vehicle in an attache case along with a
handgun (R. 27, 341-42).
affidavit

This information was included in the

(R. 27). Leatham also believed that defendant had

previously been charged and convicted with distribution of
cocaine and included this information in the affidavit

(R. 26,

241, 342). Defendant, however, had only been charged with
distribution and was awaiting trial (R. 342-43).
When he searched defendant's home, Leatham went
directly to the bedroom and found a baggie of white powder where
the C.I. told him it was hidden (R. 213, 216-17, 344). He then
replaced the baggie in its hiding place and allowed drug-sniffing
dogs to relocate it as a test of their abilities (R. 220, 237).
Leatham probably showed the baggie to a second officer who was
logging the seized items after he pulled it from the bed frame
the first time (R. 217, 248, 252, 255). Later, Leatham showed
the baggie to defendant who said that it was not cocaine but was
a vitamin B complex (R. 225, 302, 345) and told Leatham to feel
it, because it was "soft", not hard like cocaine (R. 305, 306,
345).
Defendant and his roommate, Donna Alex, testified that
there was no one in their home within 24 hours of the search
except possibly Ms. Alex's sister-in-law who could not have been
the C.I. (R. 286, 297, 358, 361, 362). Ms. Alex said she had
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never seen cocaine within their home in the two or three months
she lived there prior to the search (R. 287).

Defendant

testified that he did not have any cocaine in his bedroom and
assumed that Sgt. Leatham put the baggie of cocaine in his room
(R. 296-97).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court properly refused to suppress the

evidence where it found that the totality of the circumstances
supported the magistrates finding of probable cause.

Moreover,

even if the warrant lacked probable cause, the evidence was not
seized in a substantial violation of defendant's constitutional
rights or in bad faith.
II.

There was no error in denying an ir\ camera hearing

for determination of the materiality of the confidential
informant's identity since the court found that the evidence was
not material to defendant's defense.

Even if a hearing was

required, the remedy would be a remand for an in camera
proceeding and not complete reversal of defendant's conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS SUPPORTED BY
PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY REFUSED TO SUPPRESS THE SEIZED
EVIDENCE.
Defendant argues that the affidavit in support of the
search warrant lacked sufficient indicia of reliability for the
magistrate to find that probable cause existed.

He also asserts

that the affidavit did not establish the basis of the
confidential informant's (C.I.) knowledge.
-4-

As argued below, the

affidavit, as a whole, established a substantial basis for the
magistrate's conclusion that the totality of the circumstances
estaolished probable cause.

See State v. Hansen, 50 Utah Adv.

Rep. 3 (filed Jan. 20, 1987); United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791
F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1986) .
While defendant did move to suppress the cocaine prior
to trial, he did not preserve his objection by raising it at
trial when the evidence was offered and admitted

(R. 281). A

defendant is required to object to admission of evidence at trial
even though a pretrial motion to suppress was made and denied.
State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983).

Even if defendant had

objected at trial, the evidence was properly admitted.
First, this

Court must "payN great deterrence to a

judicial determination of probable cause,"

Hansenf 50 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 3, as does the Utah Supreme Court.

See also State v.

Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 1983); State v. Romero, 660
P.2d 715 (Utah 1983).

"Search warrant affidavits are to be

construed in a common-sense, reasonable manner."

Hansen, 50 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 3; United States v. Lueth, 807 F.2d 719, 724-25 (8th
Cir. 1986) .

Courts should not undertake a de novo review of an

affidavit's sufficiency or interpret them in a hypertechnical
manner.

United States v. Pelham, 801 F.2d 875, 877 (6th Cir.

1986).
The affidavit in this case, viewed in the totality of
the circumstances established a fair probability that the cocaine
existed and could be found where the informant stated.
v. Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984).
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See State

While the affidavit

did not outline every instance in which the informant provided
reliable information it implied that he had given reliable
information over the past four months in paragraph 2.

A fair

reading of the paragraph indicates that the officer had worked
with the informant and received other reliable information in the
recent past which furthered police investigations.

This Court

should recognize that the affidavit was drafted by a nonlawyer in
the "midst and haste of a criminal investigation.

Technical

requirements of elaborate specificity once enacted under common
law pleading have no proper place in this area."

United States

v. Pelham, 801 F.2d at 877, quoting United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).

The Utah Courts have required a lesser

standard of reliability and veracity where the circumstances as a
whole indicated that the report was truthful.
at 1206.

Bailey, 675 P.2d

The further information that a second confidential

informant identified defendant as a drug dealer and that
defendant was previously arrested on cocaine charges corroborates
the first informant's information.

C.f. Bailey, 675 P.2d at

1206; and see Hansen, 50 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4.
Defendant complains that the police officer made a
fatal misstatement when he noted that defendant had been
previously convicted of dealing cocaine.

While it is undisputed

that this statement was erroneous, it was not fatal to the
determination of probable cause.

Material misstatements are only

fatal where, when they are excised, the affidavit lacks
sufficient other facts upon which to base the probable cause
determination.

State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986).
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Courts avoid suppressing evidence when the actual facts, if known
to the magistrate would have resulted in a finding of probable
cause,

id. at 191.

Here, there was sufficient other truthful

information upon which probable cause was based.
Defendant also contends that the officer lied about the
existence of a second informant.

This is an erroneous assertion.

Leatham testified that the informant's statement was received
through a fellow police officer.

The affidavit does not indicate

that this was first-hand knowledge.

Since police officers often

rely on hearsay information from other officers, and rightfully
so, it was not error for the magistrate to rely on this
information.

See Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 192.

Defendant finally argues that the affidavit was not
truthful because the police did not find a large quantity of
cocaine or even at least an ounce of cocaine.

This information

was not available at the time the afidavit was sworn and should
not be used after the fact to second-guess the magistrate's
finding of probable cause.

The issue is whether the affidavit,

as presented to the magistrate, presented a fair probability that
at least an ounce of cocaine would be found in defendant's home.
Because the affidavit establishes that the informant saw what
looked like at least an ounce of cocaine within 24 hours of
issuance of the warrant, the fact that a portion of the white
powder tested out as something else at a later time is not
controlling.

The magistrate had before him sufficient facts to

indicate a fair probability that cocaine was in defendant's home
and the trial court properly refused to suppress the evidence.
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Even if this Court were to find that there was not
probable cause to issue the search warrant in this case, the
cocaine was still admissible under Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g).

Rule

12(g) requires that a violation of constitutional rights be
substantial and in bad faith before evidence can be suppressed.
The trial court specifically found, in light of the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing, that there was no
violation; but if there was, it was insubstantial and made in
good faith.

Given the sometimes irreconcilable differences in

court decisions in this area, the officer's actions in this case
would not constitute a substantial violation of defendant's
rights.

Also given that the magistrate issued the search warrant

based upon the affidavit as it was written, the officer acted in
good faith in relying on its authority.

Sgt. Leatham's actions

reflected reasonable law enforcement activity that should not
result in the exclusion of substantial, reliable evidence.
United States v. Leon,

U.S.

See

, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).

Leatham could not be expected to know that the magistrate erred,
if he did, in issuing the search warrant based upon the affidvait
which alleged that the C.I. had proved his reliability in the
last four months.

See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982) (holding that, in civil rights actions, government
officials "are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.").
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT
DISCLOSURE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT'S
IDENTITY.
Defendant asserts that the trial court should have
granted his motion for disclosure of the C.I.'s identity.

He

insists that disclosure was necessary to establish the existence
of the C.I. and to determine whether he had an opportunity to
"plant" the cocaine which defendant denied belonged to him.
Under the standard for disclosure of a C.I.'s identity outlined
below, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion.
The State possesses a limited privilege against
disclosure of an informant's identity in order to protect the
safety of informants and to preserve the continued free flow of
information from such persons,

Rovario v. United States, 353

U.S. 53 (1957); c.f. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986).
The decision whether to provide a defendant with this information
is within the discretion of the trial court and requires
balancing of the defendant's need for the information against the
government's interest in preserving its confidentiality. Id.
Unless the C.I.'s identity is "essential to a fair determination
of the issues," Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 193, due process does not
require disclosure.

Usually, the State need not disclose where

the C.I.'s involvement was limited to the issue of probable
cause, McCrav v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), nor where he is
not a witness United States v. Dvba, 554 F.2d 417 (10th Cir.
1977) .
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A defendant roust do more than speculate on the
materiality of the C.I.'s identity and the usefulness of his
testimony at trial.

Nielsen, 727 P.2d 193; United States v.

Burrell, 720 F.2d 1488, 1494 n. 8 (10th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102r 1108 (4th Cir. 1985).

Disclosure is not

necessarily required even though defendant may have no other
means of determining what relevant information the C.I.
possesses.

Smith, 780 F.2d at 1108.

The most important factor

to be considered is the materiality of the C.I.'s evidence to
defendant's particular defense.

Ld.; and see United States v.

Grisham, 748 F.2d 460, 463-64 (8th Cir. 1984).

And, this

determination, again, is usually within the trial court's
discretion.

Smith, 780 F.2d at 1108.

In this case, defendant insists that the C.I. was the
only person who could adroit or deny his own existence and whether
he was guilty of planting drugs in defendant's home.

It is

obvious that any defendant in circumstances similar to these
could claim that someone planted the drugs and thereby frustrate
the government's strong interest in protecting its C.I.

In a

similar case, however, at least one court has denied disclosure
of an informant's identity.

See United States v. Jefferson, 593

F. Supp. 85, 89-90 (D.D.C. 1984).

There, Jefferson claimed that

someone set him up because he did not know about the existence of
drugs found in the trunk of his car.

The court observed that the

C.I. would not be used as a witness to tie Jefferson to the drugs
and that hundreds of other defendant's were in similar
circumstances.

Because only the officers' testimony was
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necessary to tie Jefferson to the drugs and the C.I. took no part
in any drug transaction but merely observed the drugs in the
car's trunk at some point in time, the C.I.'s testimony was not
material to the issues at trial.
As the court noted in Miller v. United States, 273 F.2d
279, 281 (5th Cir. 1959):
If the informer's relation to the acts
leading directly to or constituting the crime
may be assumed from a fertile imagination of
counsel, the Government in practically every
case would have to prove affirmatively that
the informant had not done any such likely
acts. Having done that, all would be
revealed and the informer privilege, deemed
essential for the public interest, for all
practical purposes would be no more.
In this case, the trial court was satisfied from Sgt.
Leatham's testimony that the C.I. did exist and so ruled (R. 53).
The court was in a position to weigh the credibility of the
testimony given by both Leatham and defendant about the C.I.'s
existence.
State.

The court clearly resolved the issue in favor of the

Moreover, defendant was not prevented from presenting his

theory that there either was no informant and the officer planted
the drugs or that the informant could have planted them.

He and

his roommate testified that no one was inside their home within
24 hours of the search with their knowledge and consent.

Their

testimony would presumably have been the same had the C.I. been
at trial claiming he was there and would have

carried even less

weight in the face of a warm body claiming otherwise,

it is

doubtful the C.I. would have appeared and testified that he
planted drugs as defendant theorizes.
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Admittedly, defendant goes further than challenging the
mere existence of a C.I. to claim that he did not possess any
cocaine and that the baggie of cocaine must have been planted in
his home.

On the other hand, defendant's attempt to identify the

white powdery substance at the time it was discovered as vitamin
B powder contradicts his claim that he did not know the baggie of
powder was in his home.

Given this contradiction, the trial

court properly concluded that the identity of the C.I. was not
material to defendant's defense.
Defendant also urges this Court to adopt a rule
requiring i_n camera hearings on the issue of disclosure of a
C.I.'s identity.

While there is some support in federal and

other states' case law for such a hearing, this is a question of
first impression in Utah.
such a requirement.

This Court should not lightly adopt

Such hearings are one remedy for the dilemma

presented when a court is faced with the difficult task of
balancing the defendant's due process rights against the State's
interest in nondisclosure, but they are certainly not required in
all cases where a defendant raises the issue.
Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 809 (9th Cir. 1984).
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).

United States v.
See also Alderman v.

If the trial court is

satisfied with the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the
State and the defendant on the question of materiality without
questioning of the C.I., as the court was here, then in camera
proceedings would seem unnecessary.
If this Court chooses to require an jj\

camera hearing

in cases such as this one, then the State requests that this case
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be remanded to the trial court for an in camera determination of
the C.I.'s materiality to the defense rather than ordering
dismissal as defendant suggests.

Federal courts have remanded

cases for similar proceedings, see e.g. Gaines v. Hess, 662 F.2d
1364, 1367-68 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Freund, 525 F.2d
873, 878 (5th Cir, 1976).

Although Sgt. Leatham said he would

not disclose the name of the C.I. to defendant or at trial under
any circumstances, disclosure would not be necessary unless the
trial court determined after the In camera hearing that
disclosure was material to defendant's defense.

Thus, an in

camera hearing is not precluded as defendant suggests and would
be a more reasonable result than outright reversal of defendant's
conviction.
The Court may wish to lay guidelines for the lower
court's use should a remand be necessary.

For this purpose, the

discussion contained in Ordonez, 737 F.2d at 809-810, may provide
assistance in fashioning a proceeding that is fair to defendant
while maintaining the highest degree of protection for the C.I.
until disclosure is ordered.
CONCLUSION
The State requests this Court to affirm the trial
court's decisions on the motion to suppress evidence and upon the
motion to disclose the C.I.'s identity.
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In the event this court

determines that an in camera hearing was necessary on the issue
of disclosure, the State requests a remand for such a hearing.
DATED this 3Qf& day of March, 1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

/SANDRA L.^JOGR-EN
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

-15-

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PROVO CITY, UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF UTAH )

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF ISSUANCE OF
SEARCH WARRANT

I, Bradley S. Leatham, being first duly sworn on oath on this
14th day of January, 1986, deposes and says:
1. That your affiant is a police officer for the City of Provo
and is currently assigned to the Detective Division, Special Operations
Section.

I am currently assigned as Sergeant of that unit.

I have

been employed as a police officer by Provo City for an excess of ten
years.
2.

On the 14th day of January, 1986, I received information from

a confidential informant that Robert P. Holyoak is in possession of a
large amount of cocaine at the address of 414 East 200 South, Provo, Utah.
3.

That said informant has proven his reliability in the past four

months.
4.

That within the last 24 hours said informant did observe what

appeared to be at least one ounce of cocaine in the residence at 414 East
200 South.
5. The above mentioned residence at 414 East 200 South is described
as a yellow stucco home located on the southeast corner of 4th East 2nd
South.

The entrance of the home is facing north and has double doors

going into the residence from a porch.

The residence has a driveway

and carport on the east side of the home and has a large pine tree on
the northwest corner of the lot.

The home also has a seperate residence

on the southern portion of the home with the entrance to that residence
being on the west side.

The numbers 414 are displayed on the front portion

of the house facing north.
6.

The material being sought by application of this Search Warrant

1s held in violation of the Utah Controlled Substance Act and is a felony
of a third degree by simple possession.
7.

That said Robert Holyoak has in the past been convicted of

sales of cocaine and has also been charged with possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute.

top

2
8.

Information from a second confidential Informant states that

Robert Holyoak distributes a large amount of cocaine, that cocaine is
often transported 1n whatever vehicle he is driving and 1n a attache case.
Also contained 1n the attache case would be a hand gun. Both the
narcotics and the weapon have been observed in the attache case on numerous
occasions.
9.

During the service of a Search Warrant in September, 1985, a

large number of firearms were located consisting of handguns, shotguns,
and long rifles, some semi-automatic.
10.

Hy experience as a police officer inthe detection of controlled

substances is to the effect that this material is easily and quickly
disposed of, either by intentional destruction or consumption and can be
easily and quickly moved from its present location.
11.

Wherefore, I respectfully request that this Court issue its

Warrant for the Search at any time of the day or night of the residence
identified above and anyone inside for the presence of any controlled
substance.
12.

By reason of the fact that the material is easily and quickly

disposed of, I request that any Warrant for the Search of the said
residence authorize entry into the residence without first advising the
occupants thereof of authority or intent.
13.

Your affiant also requests that the Warrant be issued to

search any vehicles in his possession or registered to him,

due to

the information outlined in paragraph 8 above.

Unmy

^

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 14th day of January, 1986.

TIME: 4"-f^~

/

